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Abstract:	  This	  paper	  examines	  both	  the	  presence	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  ideology	  on	  the	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  
Union.	  It	  argues	  that	  Member	  States	  within	  the	  Council	  should	  not	  be	  treated	  as	  unitary	  actors	  given	  that	  in	  fact,	  
member	  states	  are	  represented	  by	  delegations	  of	  national	  ministers	  who	  often	  have	  very	  diverse	  ideological	  
beliefs	  and	  preferences	  regarding	  EU	  integration.	  Through	  the	  analysis	  of	  an	  original	  database	  of	  all	  national	  
ministers	  from	  all	  member	  states	  between	  2000	  and	  2012	  in	  conjunction	  with	  existing	  data	  on	  ideological	  and	  
EU	  positions	  (Chapel	  Hill	  Expert	  Surveys)	  and	  the	  policy	  positions	  of	  EU	  actors,	  member	  states	  on	  a	  set	  of	  policy	  
proposals	  as	  well	  as	  final	  outcomes	  (Decision	  Making	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  –DEU	  II	  data).	  	  This	  analysis	  
demonstrates	  that	  there	  are	  statistically	  significant	  differences	  between	  the	  different	  Council	  formations	  and	  the	  
median	  positions	  of	  the	  prime	  ministers	  of	  the	  member	  states	  supporting	  the	  need	  to	  disaggregate	  analyses	  of	  
the	  Council	  and	  rejecting	  member	  states	  as	  unitary	  actors.	  Moreover,	  the	  research	  provides	  insights	  into	  the	  
relative	  impact	  of	  prime	  ministers	  versus	  ministers	  on	  EU	  policy	  outcomes,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  role	  of	  the	  other	  branch	  
of	  the	  EU	  legislative	  branch,	  the	  EP.	  	  While	  not	  conclusive,	  this	  research	  suggests	  that	  we	  need	  a	  more	  nuanced	  
understanding	  of	  the	  Council	  to	  accurately	  evaluate	  the	  role	  of	  ideology	  in	  EU	  policy	  making	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  
different	  national	  and	  EU	  level	  actors	  in	  the	  process.	  	  	  The	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (Council)	  has	  played	  a	  pivotal	  role	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  (EU)	  since	  the	  days	  of	  the	  European	  Economic	  Community.	  It	  has	  long	  been	  recognized	  as	  the	  most	  directly	  powerful	  institution	  within	  the	  EU	  policy	  process,	  and	  indeed	  for	  much	  of	  the	  EU’s	  history	  it	  was	  central	  in	  both	  the	  executive	  and	  legislative	  arenas.	  However,	  successive	  treaty	  revisions,	  including	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  European	  Council	  and	  the	  gradual	  empowerment	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  (EP),	  have	  dramatically	  altered	  the	  Council	  and	  transformed	  its	  role	  within	  the	  EU	  policy-­‐making	  process.	  Despite	  these	  transformations	  there	  has	  been	  little	  attempt	  to	  rethink	  how	  we	  interpret	  the	  Council	  within	  the	  institutional	  structure	  of	  the	  EU	  or	  the	  opportunity	  the	  Council	  offers	  for	  national	  political	  actors	  to	  pursue	  their	  ideological	  preferences	  at	  the	  supranational	  level,	  even	  when	  those	  preferences	  diverge	  from	  the	  positions	  of	  the	  prime	  minister.	  This	  research	  attempts	  to	  introduce	  ideology	  into	  the	  Council	  by	  disaggregating	  its	  membership	  and	  re-­‐conceptualizing	  it	  as	  part	  of	  the	  EU	  legislative	  branch,	  as	  suggested	  by	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  reforms.	  The	  goal	  is	  not	  only	  to	  gain	  greater	  insight	  into	  the	  potential	  role	  of	  ideology	  within	  the	  Council,	  but	  also	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  broader	  role	  of	  ideology	  and	  bicameralism	  within	  the	  EU	  policy	  process.	  	  To	  fully	  comprehend	  the	  impact	  of	  ideology	  on	  decision	  making	  within	  the	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  and	  through	  the	  Council	  on	  legislative	  outcomes,	  we	  need	  to	  accomplish	  several	  things.2	  The	  first	  task	  is	  to	  improve	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  shaping	  our	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Council	  as	  a	  political	  institution.	  The	  history	  of	  the	  Council	  (previously	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Paper	  prepared	  for	  the	  2015	  biennial	  meeting	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  Studies	  Association	  (EUSA),	  Boston,	  MA.	  An	  earlier	  version	  of	  this	  paper	  was	  presented	  at	  the	  2014	  meeting	  of	  the	  American	  Political	  Science	  Association	  (APSA),	  Washington	  DC.	  2	  Throughout	  this	  paper	  the	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  is	  referred	  to	  simply	  as	  the	  Council	  unless	  discussing	  specifically	  the	  historical	  incarnation	  of	  the	  Council	  as	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers.	  2	  Throughout	  this	  paper	  the	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  is	  referred	  to	  simply	  as	  the	  Council	  unless	  discussing	  specifically	  the	  historical	  incarnation	  of	  the	  Council	  as	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers.	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the	  Council	  of	  Ministers)	  is	  one	  of	  evolution	  and	  change	  as	  its	  role	  within	  the	  EU	  has	  shifted	  from	  a	  mixture	  of	  quasi-­‐executive	  functions	  and	  legislative	  dominance	  to	  minimal	  executive	  roles	  and	  co-­‐legislator	  with	  the	  European	  Parliament.	  The	  gradual	  evolution	  of	  the	  European	  Council	  has	  shifted	  the	  Council	  to	  an	  increasingly	  legislative	  role,	  as	  was	  recognized	  formally	  in	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty,	  which	  placed	  it	  squarely	  within	  the	  legislative	  branch	  as	  part	  of	  a	  bicameral	  system	  (TEU,	  Articles	  14	  and	  16).	  This	  transformation	  requires	  that	  we	  re-­‐conceptualize	  the	  Council	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  legislative	  chamber	  and	  work	  to	  develop	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  that	  takes	  account	  of	  its	  particularities.	  	  Next,	  we	  need	  to	  gain	  a	  more	  complete	  understanding	  of	  the	  membership	  of	  the	  Council.	  Most	  studies	  of	  the	  Council	  treat	  member	  states	  as	  unitary	  actors	  and	  consider	  the	  countries	  to	  be	  the	  relevant	  actors	  (often	  with	  the	  identity/preferences	  of	  the	  prime	  minister	  used	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  country	  as	  a	  whole).	  However,	  member	  state	  delegations	  to	  the	  Council	  actually	  consist	  of	  multiple	  different	  people	  working	  through	  the	  various	  Council	  configurations	  and	  managing	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Committee	  of	  Permanent	  Representatives	  (Coreper)	  that	  prepares	  Council	  draft	  legislation.	  Moreover,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  coalition	  governments,	  in	  most	  cases	  these	  individuals	  are	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  national	  political	  parties.	  Thus,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  actors	  within	  the	  Council	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  individuals	  who	  have	  the	  task	  of	  representing	  their	  national/member	  state’s	  interests,	  but	  whose	  interpretation	  of	  those	  interests	  may	  vary	  substantially	  based	  on	  their	  individual	  ideological	  positions.	  As	  such	  it	  is	  imperative	  that	  we	  pay	  attention	  to	  the	  individual	  characteristics	  of	  the	  various	  national	  ministers,	  including	  a	  consideration	  of	  their	  likely	  ideological	  differences	  based	  on	  the	  portfolio	  allocation	  norms	  that	  exist	  in	  most	  parliamentary	  systems.3	  	  Finally,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  connect	  the	  lessons	  learned	  in	  the	  first	  and	  second	  points	  to	  the	  EU	  legislative	  process	  itself.	  This	  will	  permit	  us	  to	  develop	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  understanding	  of	  the	  potential	  impact	  of	  the	  Council,	  and	  ideology	  within	  the	  Council	  in	  particular,	  on	  the	  EU	  policy-­‐making.	  	  This	  analysis	  should	  include	  the	  relative	  and	  cumulative	  influence	  of	  both	  chambers	  of	  the	  legislative	  branch.	  Looking	  only	  at	  the	  coalition	  formation	  process	  in	  the	  Council	  does	  not	  make	  sense	  in	  a	  post-­‐Lisbon	  EU	  in	  which	  the	  Council	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  dominant	  legislative	  actor.	  Indeed,	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  policy	  areas	  the	  EP	  is	  a	  co-­‐legislator	  and	  policy	  outcomes	  in	  the	  EU	  will	  reflect	  the	  priorities	  and	  preferences	  of	  both	  the	  Council	  and	  the	  EP.4	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Other	  variations	  between	  countries	  that	  should	  also	  be	  examined	  include	  the	  level	  of	  centralization	  within	  the	  coalition	  and	  the	  integration	  of	  EU	  policy	  into	  domestic	  policy	  management	  (through	  for	  example	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  Minister	  for	  Europe).	  These	  variables	  will	  be	  included	  in	  future	  iterations	  of	  this	  research.	  4	  Of	  course	  the	  impact	  of	  other	  actors	  may	  also	  be	  important	  depending	  on	  the	  policy	  area.	  The	  Commission,	  in	  particular,	  is	  important	  because	  of	  its	  formal	  control	  of	  the	  initiation	  of	  all	  proposals.	  However,	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  Council	  and	  the	  EP	  to	  amend	  Commission	  original	  proposals	  means	  that	  outcomes	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  reflect	  the	  positions	  of	  the	  pivotal	  actors	  in	  these	  two	  institutions	  regardless	  of	  what	  the	  Commission	  introduces	  initially.	  It	  can	  make	  strategic	  proposals	  that	  reflect	  these	  preferences	  (and	  are	  in	  the	  win-­‐set	  of	  the	  Council	  and	  EP)	  or	  it	  can	  see	  its	  proposals	  substantially	  altered	  to	  reflect	  Council	  and	  EP	  preferences.	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What	  Kind	  of	  Legislative	  Chamber?	  	  	  Like	  most	  institutions	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  the	  Council	  has	  evolved	  substantially	  since	  it	  was	  first	  introduced	  as	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  in	  the	  European	  Economic	  Community	  (EEC).5	  Despite	  the	  changes	  it	  has	  experienced,	  there	  has	  been	  comparatively	  little	  attention	  to	  the	  institutional	  development	  of	  the	  Council.	  While	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  has	  been	  prolific,	  most	  analyses	  of	  the	  Council	  focus	  on	  descriptions	  of	  its	  core	  tasks	  and	  operating	  procedures	  (Westlake	  and	  Galloway,	  2006;	  Wallace	  and	  Renshaw,	  1997)	  and/or	  the	  character	  of	  coalition	  formation	  within	  it	  (Hagemann	  and	  Hoyland,	  2008;	  Blavoukos	  and	  Pagoulatos,	  2011;	  Elgstrom	  et	  al,	  2001;	  Hosli	  et	  al,	  2011)).	  The	  actual	  institutional	  role	  of	  the	  Council	  within	  the	  EU	  political	  system	  has	  received	  little	  attention	  and	  its	  historical	  and	  current	  roles	  are	  often	  conflated.	  	  	  When	  the	  EEC	  was	  created	  there	  was	  no	  clear	  political	  executive	  for	  the	  new	  organization.	  Indeed,	  the	  powerful	  role	  the	  Commission	  had	  held	  (as	  the	  High	  Authority)	  in	  the	  European	  Coal	  and	  Steel	  Community	  (ECSC)	  had	  been	  downgraded	  and	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  remained	  vague	  at	  best.	  There	  was	  no	  alternative	  political	  executive	  within	  the	  EEC	  structure	  initially;	  even	  informal	  summitry	  between	  national	  leaders	  outside	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  did	  not	  begin	  until	  the	  1970s.	  As	  a	  result	  most	  political	  leadership	  came	  from	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers.	  At	  this	  point	  it	  was	  also	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  that	  controlled	  the	  legislative	  process	  since	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  EP	  were	  consultative	  only.	  Thus,	  the	  Council	  (of	  Ministers)	  played	  a	  dual	  role,	  serving	  both	  as	  the	  political	  leadership	  of	  the	  EEC	  and	  as	  its	  primary	  legislative	  actor.	  However,	  over	  time	  other	  EU	  institutions	  being	  created	  or	  gaining	  new	  powers	  have	  transformed	  both	  of	  these	  roles.	  	  In	  the	  executive	  realm	  the	  gradual	  creation	  and	  then	  formalization	  of	  summitry	  since	  the	  1970s	  has	  provided	  an	  alternative	  source	  of	  executive	  political	  guidance	  for	  the	  EU.6	  The	  formal	  introduction	  of	  the	  European	  Council	  in	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  provided	  an	  effective	  and	  democratically	  legitimate	  source	  of	  executive	  political	  guidance	  for	  the	  EU.	  In	  doing	  so	  it	  freed	  the	  Council	  from	  the	  majority	  of	  its	  executive	  roles,	  as	  witnessed	  by	  the	  gradual	  reform	  and	  reduction	  in	  the	  task	  of	  the	  General	  Affairs	  configuration	  within	  the	  Council.7	  The	  introduction	  and	  development	  of	  the	  European	  Council	  effectively	  pushed	  the	  Council	  toward	  a	  more	  concentrated	  focus	  on	  its	  role	  as	  a	  second	  chamber	  within	  the	  EU’s	  legislative	  branch.	  However,	  here	  as	  well	  there	  have	  been	  significant	  changes	  over	  time.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  The	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  was	  also	  present	  in	  the	  European	  Coal	  and	  Steel	  Community	  that	  preceded	  the	  EEC,	  however	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  EEC	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  began	  to	  take	  on	  the	  central	  leadership	  role	  that	  defined	  it	  for	  much	  of	  the	  subsequent	  history	  of	  the	  EU.	  6	  There	  are	  many	  who	  consider	  the	  Commission	  to	  be	  the	  executive	  branch	  of	  the	  EU.	  While	  it	  is	  certainly	  part	  of	  the	  executive	  branch,	  its	  technocratic	  structure,	  unelected	  character	  and	  formal	  rejection	  of	  ideological	  or	  national	  partisanship	  effectively	  preclude	  the	  Commission	  from	  serving	  as	  the	  political	  executive	  of	  the	  EU.	  It	  is	  instead	  the	  administrative	  or	  bureaucratic	  arm	  of	  the	  executive	  branch.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  not	  an	  important	  component	  of	  policy	  making,	  but	  rather	  to	  clarify	  its	  bureaucratic	  and	  administrative	  character.	  7	  The	  creation	  of	  a	  High	  Representative	  for	  Foreign	  Affairs	  (Amsterdam	  and	  Lisbon	  Treaties)	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  External	  Action	  Service	  also	  shift	  this	  executive	  function	  further	  from	  the	  Council	  and	  more	  towards	  the	  European	  Council.	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Indeed,	  in	  the	  legislative	  realm	  it	  is	  by	  now	  well	  understood	  that	  since	  the	  1970s	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  EP	  have	  been	  steadily	  expanding	  (Kreppel,	  2002;	  Rittberger,	  2007).	  This	  process,	  which	  began	  with	  the	  acquisition	  of	  partial	  budgetary	  powers	  for	  the	  EP	  in	  the	  1970s,	  expanded	  to	  amendment	  and	  veto	  powers	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  and	  culminated	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  ordinary	  legislative	  procedure	  (OLP)	  in	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  (TEU	  articles	  289	  and	  294).8	  The	  OLP	  effectively	  puts	  the	  EP	  on	  equal	  footing	  in	  legislative	  decision	  making	  with	  the	  Council	  in	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  policy	  arenas.	  Thus,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  the	  Council	  shifted	  toward	  a	  primarily	  legislative	  role,	  it	  also	  increasingly	  had	  to	  share	  that	  role	  with	  an	  emergent	  EP.	  	  	  The	  result	  is	  a	  Council	  that	  should	  now	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  legislative	  chamber	  within	  a	  bicameral	  system.	  Indeed,	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  clarifies	  both	  the	  legislative	  character	  of	  the	  Council	  and	  the	  bicameral	  structure	  of	  the	  EU	  legislative	  branch	  (TEU,	  Articles	  14	  and	  16)	  Thus,	  the	  impact	  of	  ideology,	  and	  ideological	  variation	  between	  the	  ministers	  that	  constitute	  the	  Council	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  within	  this	  broader	  institutional	  context.	  This	  requires	  that	  we	  pause	  to	  re-­‐conceptualize	  the	  Council	  as	  a	  legislature.	  This	  will	  then	  allow	  us	  to	  apply	  existing	  theories	  of	  legislative	  behavior	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  ideology	  and	  bicameralism	  to	  the	  Council	  and	  EU	  policy	  making	  more	  generally.	  	  	  The	  Council	  itself	  is	  a	  complex	  and	  often	  confusing	  institution.	  In	  part,	  this	  is	  because	  it	  is	  organized	  functionally	  as	  multiple	  Councils	  rather	  than	  a	  single	  unitary	  body.	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  create	  a	  list	  of	  all	  members	  of	  the	  Council,	  though	  a	  list	  of	  all	  potential	  members	  would	  include	  all	  national	  ministers	  of	  the	  member	  states.	  The	  Council	  is	  organized	  into	  ‘configurations’	  according	  to	  specific	  policy	  arenas.	  Currently	  there	  are	  ten	  different	  configurations	  including	  the	  general	  affairs	  and	  foreign	  affairs	  configurations.9	  One	  way	  to	  conceptualize	  the	  Council	  is	  to	  think	  of	  it	  as	  a	  legislature	  that	  meeting	  in	  committee	  only	  –	  never	  in	  full	  plenary	  (Kreppel,	  2013).	  From	  this	  perspective	  the	  various	  configurations	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  committees,	  many	  of	  which	  effectively	  have	  sub-­‐committees	  for	  specific	  policy	  areas.	  This	  is	  because	  most	  of	  the	  formal	  configurations	  include	  several	  diverse	  policy	  areas	  (such	  as	  youth,	  culture	  and	  sport)	  and	  different	  national	  ministers	  serve	  within	  these	  configurations	  depending	  of	  the	  specific	  policy	  being	  addressed.	  As	  a	  result	  the	  national	  ministers	  tasked	  with	  cultural	  policy	  are	  involved	  when	  the	  topic	  is	  culture,	  while	  the	  ministers	  for	  education	  participate	  when	  the	  policy	  under	  consideration	  is	  related	  to	  education	  etc.	  In	  some	  cases	  these	  may	  be	  the	  same	  person,	  in	  others	  it	  will	  not.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  The	  EP	  gained	  approval	  over	  discretionary	  spending	  in	  the	  1970	  and	  1975	  Budgetary	  Treaty	  reforms.	  The	  Isoglucose	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  case	  (Roquette	  Frères	  v.	  Council,	  138/79)	  indirectly	  granted	  the	  EP	  a	  limited	  power	  of	  delay	  while	  the	  Single	  European	  Act	  and	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaties	  gave	  the	  EP	  direct	  legislative	  authority	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  cooperation	  and	  co-­‐decision	  procedures	  respectively.	  See	  Rittberger,	  2007	  for	  additional	  details.	  9	  	   The	  ten	  current	  configurations	  include	  General	  affairs,	  Foreign	  affairs,	  Economic	  and	  financial	  affairs	  (including	  budget),	  Justice	  and	  home	  affairs	  (including	  civil	  protection),	  Employment,	  social	  policy,	  health	  and	  consumer	  affairs,	  Competitiveness	  (internal	  market,	  industry,	  research	  and	  space),	  Transport,	  telecommunications	  and	  energy,	  Agriculture	  and	  fisheries,	  Environment	  and	  Education,	  youth,	  culture	  and	  sport	  (including	  audiovisual).	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At	  the	  same	  time,	  because	  the	  Council	  legally	  is	  a	  single	  institution,	  formally	  any	  configuration	  can	  vote	  on	  any	  policy	  proposal.	  In	  practice	  little	  attention	  is	  given	  to	  which	  configuration	  deals	  with	  a	  proposal	  only	  if	  the	  policy	  proposal	  is	  tabled	  as	  an	  ‘A’	  point	  on	  the	  agenda,	  indicating	  that	  an	  agreement	  has	  already	  been	  reached	  in	  the	  preparatory	  stages	  by	  the	  relevant	  actors	  representing	  the	  position	  and	  preferences	  of	  the	  national	  ministry	  in	  Coreper.10	  When	  there	  are	  still	  substantive	  policy	  relevant	  issues	  to	  be	  negotiated,	  resulting	  in	  the	  proposal	  being	  tabled	  as	  a	  ‘B’	  point	  on	  the	  agenda,	  only	  the	  appropriate	  configuration	  will	  take	  up	  the	  issue.11	  Regardless	  of	  which	  configuration	  ultimately	  amends	  and	  adopts	  or	  rejects	  a	  proposal,	  that	  decision	  is	  never	  taken	  up	  by	  the	  full	  plenary	  because	  there	  is	  no	  mechanism	  for	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	  full	  Council.	  Thus,	  proposals	  are	  discussed,	  debated	  and	  amended	  by	  national	  representatives	  for	  the	  relevant	  policy	  area	  and/or	  the	  appropriate	  ministers	  themselves.	  While	  others	  may	  officially	  adopt	  these	  proposals	  (as	  ‘A’	  points),	  they	  do	  so	  only	  as	  a	  formal	  rubber	  stamp	  for	  what	  has	  been	  agreed	  to	  in	  advance	  by	  those	  working	  to	  represent	  the	  various	  member	  states’	  interests	  within	  the	  appropriate	  policy	  arena.	  There	  is	  no	  effective	  oversight	  by	  those	  not	  working	  within	  the	  specific	  policy	  arena.	  Thus,	  the	  Council	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  legislature	  that	  only	  meets	  in	  committee.	  This	  interpretation	  allows	  us	  to	  apply	  existing	  theories	  of	  legislative	  committee	  behavior	  to	  the	  Council	  to	  gain	  insight	  into	  the	  potential	  role	  of	  ideology	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  policy	  process.	  	  There	  are	  two	  ways	  to	  interpret	  the	  role	  of	  committees	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  ideological	  identity	  of	  their	  members	  relative	  to	  the	  full	  plenary.	  They	  can	  be	  either	  informational	  or	  distributive	  in	  character,	  and	  a	  single	  legislature	  may	  include	  committees	  of	  both	  types	  (Shepsle	  and	  Weingast,	  1995;	  Gilligan	  and	  Krehbiel,	  1990).	  Informational	  committees	  serve	  primarily	  as	  a	  source	  of	  information	  for	  the	  legislature	  as	  a	  whole.	  Service	  on	  the	  committee	  may	  be	  a	  reflection	  of	  pre-­‐existing	  expertise	  and/or	  it	  may	  foster	  expertise	  through	  increased	  experience	  in	  a	  specific	  policy	  area.	  The	  core	  assumption	  of	  this	  perspective	  is	  that	  committee	  members	  accurately	  reflect	  the	  policy	  preferences	  of	  the	  full	  legislature.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  committee	  will	  adopt	  a	  proposal	  that	  represents	  the	  preferences	  of	  the	  median	  Member	  of	  the	  legislature	  as	  a	  whole.12	  According	  to	  this	  interpretation	  the	  role	  of	  committees	  is	  to	  gather	  and	  digest	  information	  to	  aid	  the	  plenary	  in	  its	  decision-­‐making.	  This	  is	  required	  by	  the	  complex	  character	  of	  most	  modern	  legislation	  and	  the	  limited	  amount	  of	  time	  available	  to	  most	  members	  of	  legislatures,	  which	  makes	  it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Coreper,	  or	  the	  Committee	  of	  Permanent	  Representatives	  is made up of national ‘Heads of Mission’ (who 
hold ambassadorial rank), and Deputy Heads of Mission and their staff. It encompasses approximately 250 working 
groups and committees divided into two groups – Coreper I and Coreper II. The first is tasked with items dealing 
with social and economic issues and staffed by Deputy Heads of Mission while the second is tasked primarily with 
political, financial and foreign policy issues and staffed by the Heads of Mission (TFEU, Article 240). These 
divisions reflect what are considered to be “technical matters” (Coreper I) and those items that are “political, 
economic or institutional” matters (http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/coreper_en.htm). 	  11	  Although B items may be discussed and debated within Council formations they will generally not be voted upon 
as B points. Instead, following these discussions they will be referred back to Coreper for further negotiation based 
on the additional information and/or compromises resulting from the Council formation meeting. Eventually, once a 
compromise has been achieved they will generally be placed on the Council agenda as an A point.	  
12 Within the context of the EU, where decisions are not made by simple majority in most cases, but by qualified 
majority (under the ordinary procedure) the expected outcome would not be the median, but the QMV outcome of 
the full membership – i.e. all ministers of all national governments. 
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impossible	  for	  all	  members	  to	  effectively	  evaluate	  all	  legislation.	  As	  a	  result,	  members	  of	  the	  chamber	  choose	  to	  delegate	  much	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  authority	  they	  possess	  to	  the	  committees,	  which	  carefully	  review	  policy	  proposals	  and	  revise	  them	  to	  maximize	  the	  utility	  of	  the	  proposal	  to	  as	  many	  members	  as	  possible.13	  Within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  EU	  this	  would	  suggest	  that	  the	  Council	  configurations	  adopt	  policies	  that	  accurately	  reflect	  the	  QMV	  position	  of	  the	  Member	  State	  governments	  ideologically	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  preferences	  on	  EU	  integration.	  	  An	  alternative	  interpretation	  of	  role	  of	  committees	  posits	  that	  they	  are	  distributive	  in	  character,	  rather	  than	  simply	  informational.	  This	  interpretation	  of	  committees	  does	  not	  dispute	  the	  need	  for	  specialization	  and	  the	  impossibility	  of	  all	  members	  being	  experts	  on	  all	  legislation.	  Instead,	  it	  suggests	  that	  participation	  in	  committees	  is	  more	  instrumental,	  with	  committee	  members	  selected	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  interests	  or	  policy	  preferences	  (saliency	  of	  policy	  arenas).	  Thus,	  members	  who	  care	  more	  about	  agriculture	  (or	  whose	  constituents/voters	  do)	  will	  try	  to	  serve	  on	  the	  agriculture	  committee	  where	  they	  will	  be	  best	  placed	  to	  have	  the	  most	  influence	  on	  the	  policies	  that	  are	  most	  relevant	  to	  them.	  In	  this	  case	  members	  of	  the	  committees	  are	  not	  expected	  to	  be	  reflective	  of	  the	  median	  of	  the	  full	  plenary	  because	  the	  committee	  members	  are	  preference	  outliers	  relative	  to	  the	  average	  member	  of	  the	  chamber.	  If	  committees	  are	  distributive	  in	  character	  then	  the	  proposals	  they	  report	  out	  will	  not	  reflect	  the	  median	  position	  of	  all	  members,	  but	  rather	  those	  of	  the	  committee	  members	  themselves.	  Despite	  this	  deviation	  from	  the	  overall	  median	  such	  proposals	  would	  still	  likely	  be	  adopted	  because	  of	  the	  institutionally	  enhanced	  position	  of	  committees	  and	  the	  desire	  of	  all	  members	  to	  have	  their	  own	  committee	  proposals	  adopted	  without	  significant	  revision	  or	  other	  hurdles	  (logrolling).	  	  	  If	  applied	  to	  the	  Council	  this	  understanding	  of	  committees	  would	  suggest	  that	  at	  least	  some	  Council	  configurations	  are	  developing	  proposals	  that	  are	  not	  reflective	  of	  what	  the	  QMV	  outcome	  of	  all	  Member	  State	  governments	  would	  be,	  but	  instead	  reflect	  the	  preferences	  of	  the	  specific	  ministers	  serving	  in	  the	  Council	  configuration.	  This	  is	  a	  particularly	  relevant	  possibility	  in	  the	  EU	  context	  given	  that	  there	  is	  no	  opportunity	  for	  review	  of	  the	  proposal	  by	  the	  ‘full	  plenary.’	  Furthermore,	  the	  Council	  considers	  the	  majority	  of	  proposals	  as	  ‘A’	  points	  with	  little	  public	  scrutiny	  or	  careful	  review	  prior	  to	  official	  adoption,	  but	  with	  significant	  input	  from	  national	  ministries	  through	  formal	  and	  informal	  networks.14	  Thus,	  the	  Council	  committees	  (configurations)	  are	  institutionally	  capable	  of	  adopting	  proposals	  that	  deviate	  substantially	  from	  the	  EU	  QMV	  outcome	  that	  would	  result	  were	  all	  national	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 In most national legislatures committees report a proposal to the full plenary which then has the ultimate vote on 
adopting or rejecting and may also amend the committee proposal. In legislatures with powerful committees (such as 
the USA, Italy or Germany) committee proposals are rarely significantly amended on the floor as compromises 
between interested parties have been sought at committee stage. The fact that in the case of the Council there is no 
full floor to provide final approval is significant, but not entirely unique as in Italy committees are also empowered 
to adopt legislation without floor approval when meeting in sede legislativa. 
14 The extent to which policies can vary will also depend on the existence of national mechanisms to hold individual 
ministers to a shared national policy (Kassim, 2003). However, even in those cases where such mechanisms exist, 
they are unlikely to be foolproof given the implicit agency problem within the Council and the lack of transparency 
within Coreper and the Council working groups. Agency loss is almost inevitable for all but the most salient and 
well-monitored issues. 
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governments	  to	  decide	  together	  (in	  some	  form	  of	  plenary).	  The	  question	  is	  should	  we	  expect	  this	  deviation	  given	  the	  ideological/partisan	  character	  of	  their	  members?	  	  	  The	  first	  interpretation	  suggests	  that	  Council	  formations	  are	  accurate	  reflections	  of	  the	  Member	  State	  government	  preferences	  and	  that	  the	  use	  of	  configurations	  (and	  the	  Coreper	  structures	  that	  support	  them)	  as	  forums	  of	  expertise	  and	  specializations	  is	  merely	  a	  mechanism	  to	  efficiently	  achieve	  policy	  compromises	  that	  would	  be	  easily	  agreed	  to	  if	  discussed	  by	  all	  members	  of	  all	  national	  governments.	  The	  second	  interpretation,	  however,	  suggests	  that	  Council	  configurations	  may	  have	  a	  bigger	  impact	  on	  policy	  outcomes	  than	  this,	  especially	  if	  at	  least	  some	  of	  their	  members	  are	  preference	  outliers.	  This	  would	  be	  an	  unlikely	  outcome	  if	  all	  Member	  States	  had	  single	  party	  Governments	  controlled	  by	  an	  internally	  unified	  and	  ideologically	  cohesive	  party	  such	  that	  all	  Council	  formation	  members	  from	  each	  Member	  State,	  regardless	  of	  portfolio,	  were	  from	  the	  same	  national	  party	  and	  ideological	  background.	  However,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  below,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  The	  question	  is	  to	  what	  extent	  are	  these	  differences	  statistically	  significant	  and	  in	  which	  policy	  areas	  should	  we	  expect	  to	  find	  distributive	  versus	  informational	  Council	  committees	  (configurations)?	  	  
A	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  not	  Member	  States	  	  	  It	  is	  generally	  accepted	  that	  the	  institutional	  role	  of	  the	  Council	  is	  to	  represent	  the	  ‘interests’	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  of	  the	  EU	  (Hix	  and	  Hoyland,	  2011).	  However,	  what	  exactly	  those	  interests	  are	  will	  undoubtedly	  vary	  depending	  on	  who	  is	  representing	  them.	  For	  this	  reason	  we	  expect	  the	  position	  of	  member	  states	  within	  the	  EU	  to	  vary	  depending	  on	  the	  character	  of	  the	  government	  in	  office.	  Indeed	  changes	  in	  government,	  especially	  in	  big	  member	  states,	  have	  been	  known	  to	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  whole	  –	  for	  example:	  Charles	  de	  Gaulle	  versus	  George	  Pompidou	  in	  France	  or	  Margret	  Thatcher/John	  Major	  versus	  Tony	  Blair	  in	  the	  UK.	  Thus,	  the	  idea	  that	  ideology	  and	  EU	  position	  matter	  for	  member	  state	  representation	  in	  the	  EU	  is	  not	  new	  or	  particularly	  innovative.	  Yet	  when	  analyzing	  decision	  making	  in	  the	  Council	  the	  potential	  impact	  of	  ideology	  is	  either	  ignored,	  in	  favor	  of	  other	  possible	  motivations	  such	  as	  economic,	  geopolitical,	  etc.,	  or	  limited	  by	  a	  focus	  solely	  on	  the	  partisan	  identity	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister.15	  	  	  This	  may	  be	  a	  result	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  since	  its	  inception	  the	  Council	  has	  always	  been	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  singular,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  fact	  there	  are	  many	  Councils	  or	  “configurations”	  of	  the	  Council.	  The	  use	  of	  the	  singular	  together	  with	  the	  focus	  on	  national	  interest	  has	  led	  to	  the	  norm	  of	  treating	  member	  state	  representation	  within	  the	  Council	  as	  unitary.	  While	  it	  is	  certainly	  true	  that	  within	  any	  specific	  Council	  formation	  each	  member	  state	  is	  represented	  by	  a	  single	  individual,	  it	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  case	  that	  the	  ideological	  positions	  of	  all	  of	  a	  member	  state’s	  representatives	  across	  all	  Council	  configurations	  will	  share	  the	  same	  ideological	  position,	  either	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  position	  on	  the	  left-­‐right	  spectrum	  or	  as	  regards	  their	  position	  on	  EU	  integration.	  Neither	  is	  it	  evident	  that	  prime	  ministers	  in	  all	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  This	  practice	  is	  especially	  disconcerting	  when	  we	  recall	  that	  in	  fact	  the	  prime	  ministers	  themselves	  never	  participate	  in	  the	  Council,	  serving	  instead	  as	  the	  membership	  of	  the	  European	  Council.	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member	  states	  and	  at	  all	  times	  are	  able	  (or	  even	  interested)	  in	  controlling	  the	  decisions/negotiations	  of	  the	  national	  ministers	  that	  represent	  their	  country	  within	  the	  Council.	  	  Since	  2000	  there	  have	  consistently	  been	  only	  about	  one	  third	  of	  EU	  member	  states	  with	  single-­‐party	  governments.16	  It	  is	  important	  to	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  fact	  that	  that	  most	  member	  states	  have	  coalition	  governments	  when	  analyzing	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  Council.	  Fundamentally	  it	  means	  that	  there	  will	  be	  a	  variety	  of	  individuals	  with	  diverse	  ideological	  positions	  and	  levels	  of	  support	  for	  EU	  integration	  representing	  a	  single	  country.	  Thus,	  at	  least	  in	  these	  cases,	  treating	  member	  states	  as	  unitary	  actors	  within	  the	  Council	  is	  potentially	  a	  seriously	  flawed	  interpretation	  of	  reality	  that	  likely	  under-­‐estimates	  the	  role	  of	  ideology	  in	  decision	  making	  in	  both	  the	  Council	  and	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  	  To	  understand	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  coalition	  governments	  at	  the	  national	  level	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  remember	  the	  selection	  mechanism	  for	  Members	  of	  the	  Council	  (MCs)	  at	  the	  member	  state	  level.	  The	  national	  Minister	  tasked	  with	  the	  relevant	  policy	  arena	  represents	  each	  country	  in	  the	  various	  Council	  configurations.	  Thus,	  when	  EU	  education	  policies	  are	  being	  negotiated	  it	  is	  the	  Minister	  of	  Education	  (or	  minister	  tasked	  with	  education	  policy)	  at	  the	  national	  level	  who	  represents	  the	  member	  state.	  Since	  members	  of	  the	  Council	  are	  effectively	  selected	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  national	  governments	  are	  formed	  it	  will	  be	  useful	  to	  review	  some	  of	  what	  we	  know	  about	  the	  portfolio	  allocation	  process	  in	  parliamentary	  democracies	  –	  as	  it	  is	  this	  national	  process	  that	  determines	  the	  membership	  of	  the	  various	  Council	  configurations.	  	  	  	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  different	  models	  of	  parliamentary	  government,	  differentiated	  largely	  by	  the	  relative	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  the	  various	  actors	  involved.	  The	  ideal	  type	  of	  parliamentary	  government	  (now	  largely	  historical)	  is	  defined	  by	  its	  collegial	  character	  and	  relative	  equality	  between	  ministers	  (Müller,	  2013).	  In	  this	  type	  of	  “cabinet	  government”	  the	  prime	  minister	  is	  a	  “leader	  among	  equals.”	  The	  distribution	  of	  specific	  policy	  portfolios	  (ministries)	  is	  relatively	  unimportant	  in	  this	  model,	  since	  all	  policies	  are	  discussed	  and	  decided	  collectively	  by	  the	  government	  as	  a	  whole.	  However,	  the	  workload	  and	  complexity	  of	  issues	  managed	  by	  governments	  today	  have	  made	  this	  highly	  discursive	  and	  collegial	  mode	  of	  parliamentary	  government	  difficult,	  if	  not	  impossible.	  	  An	  alternative	  model	  is	  one	  of	  prime	  ministerial	  dominance	  or	  prime	  ministerial	  government.	  This	  model	  of	  parliamentary	  government	  focuses	  on	  the	  central	  role	  played	  by	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  –	  particularly	  in	  single	  party	  governments	  with	  strong	  hierarchically	  organized	  party	  structures	  (Crossman,	  1972;	  Muller,	  2013).	  In	  prime	  ministerial	  governments	  it	  is	  the	  prime	  minister	  who	  determines	  the	  core	  policies	  from	  which	  most	  other	  policy	  actions	  flow,	  thus	  bestowing	  a	  relatively	  minor	  policy	  role	  on	  the	  other	  ministers	  in	  the	  government	  (Dunleavy	  and	  Rhodes,	  1990).	  However,	  this	  type	  of	  parliamentary	  governance	  structure	  requires	  a	  level	  of	  prime	  ministerial	  dominance	  that	  is	  difficult	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Of	  the	  24	  countries	  included	  in	  this	  analysis	  (Luxembourg,	  Malta	  and	  Cyprus	  are	  not	  included)	  the	  percentage	  of	  single	  party	  governments	  has	  varied	  from	  a	  low	  of	  23%	  in	  2004	  to	  a	  high	  of	  36%	  in	  2012	  with	  the	  average	  at	  29%.	  
DRAFT	  –	  Please	  do	  not	  cite	  without	  permission	  from	  author	   Ver.	  2.1	  
	   9	  
achieve	  in	  most	  coalition	  governments	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  need	  to	  compromise	  across	  party	  lines	  and	  usually	  between	  party	  leaders	  to	  form	  successful	  coalitions.	  	  A	  third	  model	  of	  parliamentary	  government,	  known	  as	  “ministerial”	  or	  “fragmented”	  government	  (Andweg,	  1997)	  is	  anticipated	  when	  there	  is	  a	  need	  to	  form	  a	  governing	  coalition.	  In	  ministerial	  government	  the	  individual	  ministers	  are	  understood	  to	  have	  greater	  autonomy	  and	  policy	  control	  over	  their	  respective	  policy	  domains,	  even	  to	  the	  point	  of	  becoming	  “policy	  dictators”	  (Laver	  and	  Shepsle,	  1990,	  1996).	  This	  model	  envisions	  a	  kind	  of	  internal	  government	  logrolling	  in	  which	  ministers	  are	  likely	  to	  support	  the	  policy	  proposals	  of	  others	  in	  return	  for	  support	  for	  their	  own	  initiatives.	  This	  is	  viable	  because	  coalition	  partners	  negotiate	  over	  portfolio	  allocation	  to	  ensure	  that	  each	  is	  given	  control	  over	  policy	  areas	  likely	  to	  be	  of	  particular	  interest	  to	  their	  electoral	  base	  (Laver	  and	  Schofield,	  1998).	  Thus,	  the	  norm	  of	  Green	  parties	  holding	  environmental	  ministries	  and	  Socialist	  or	  Labor	  parties	  holding	  employment	  ministries	  within	  coalition	  governments.	  	  	  It	  is	  this	  third	  model	  of	  ministerial	  government	  that	  suggests	  the	  importance	  of	  possible	  variation	  between	  Council	  configurations	  within	  the	  EU.	  Since	  more	  than	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  the	  national	  governments	  are	  coalitions	  they	  must	  distribute	  portfolios	  (ministries)	  across	  political	  parties.	  It	  is	  rational	  to	  expect	  that	  as	  a	  result	  we	  should	  find	  patterns	  of	  ideological	  differentiation	  across	  the	  various	  Council	  configurations	  and	  EU	  policy	  areas	  and	  that	  this	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  impact	  policy	  outcomes	  if	  Council	  configuration	  are	  understood	  to	  be	  (even	  partially)	  distributive	  rather	  than	  informational.	  	  	  	  
Finding	  Ideology	  in	  the	  Council	  	  To	  test	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  we	  see	  evidence	  of	  ideological	  skew	  in	  various	  policy	  arenas	  a	  new	  dataset	  has	  been	  created	  which	  collects	  party	  information	  on	  the	  individual	  ministers	  in	  each	  member	  state	  between	  2000	  and	  2012.	  A	  total	  of	  13	  different	  ministries	  were	  selected	  based	  in	  part	  on	  areas	  of	  likely	  EU	  competence,	  as	  well	  as	  commonality	  between	  member	  states	  and	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  reflecting	  the	  policy	  areas	  represented	  in	  other	  analyses	  of	  EU	  decision-­‐making.17	  These	  13	  ministries	  were	  agriculture,	  communication-­‐technology*,	  culture,	  economy,	  employment/labor,	  foreign	  affairs,	  interior/home	  affairs,	  justice*,	  maritime-­‐fisheries,	  prime	  minister,	  taxation-­‐customs*	  and	  transport.18	  	  The	  data	  on	  the	  party	  affiliation	  for	  each	  minister	  for	  each	  year	  was	  taken	  from	  the	  European	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Research	  (EJPR)	  annual	  country	  studies	  covering	  the	  years	  2000-­‐2012	  (publications	  from	  1999-­‐2013	  were	  used).	  For	  2000-­‐2003	  only	  data	  for	  “old”	  member	  states	  were	  collected,	  from	  2004	  (2007	  for	  Bulgaria	  and	  Romania)	  data	  was	  collected	  for	  all	  member	  states.	  Information	  was	  collected	  on	  an	  annual	  basis.	  For	  changes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  In	  particular,	  the	  primary	  policy	  areas	  represented	  in	  the	  DEU	  II	  dataset	  were	  collected,	  although	  in	  some	  cases	  there	  were	  very	  few	  countries	  with	  specific	  ministries	  in	  the	  relevant	  area	  making	  the	  data	  too	  incomplete	  to	  be	  useful	  for	  further	  statistical	  analysis	  (discussed	  below).	  18	  Ministries	  marked	  with	  an	  asterisk	  (*)	  were	  included	  to	  better	  match	  with	  the	  DEU	  II	  dataset	  (discussed	  below),	  although	  in	  some	  cases	  there	  were	  not	  enough	  cases	  to	  allow	  for	  full	  utilization	  of	  the	  data.	  Other	  possible	  future	  additions	  that	  are	  represented	  in	  a	  large	  number	  of	  governments	  include	  health,	  women,	  sports,	  education,	  and	  development.	  
DRAFT	  –	  Please	  do	  not	  cite	  without	  permission	  from	  author	   Ver.	  2.1	  
	   10	  
of	  government	  or	  individual	  ministers	  within	  a	  particular	  year	  the	  minister/government	  in	  place	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  year	  was	  used.19	  	  Because	  the	  exact	  names	  of	  ministries	  vary,	  both	  within	  individual	  countries	  over	  time	  and	  between	  countries,	  specific	  assignments	  were	  made	  only	  when	  the	  title	  of	  the	  ministry	  included	  one	  of	  the	  above	  words.	  In	  some	  cases	  one	  ministry	  dealt	  with	  multiple	  topics	  (Agriculture	  and	  Transport).	  In	  these	  instances	  the	  same	  individual	  was	  assigned	  to	  both	  ministries.	  Where	  a	  specific	  key	  word	  was	  not	  used	  in	  the	  titles	  of	  any	  ministries,	  or	  where	  the	  person	  assigned	  was	  officially	  designated	  as	  non-­‐partisan	  or	  independent	  the	  data	  was	  coded	  as	  missing.20	  The	  total	  dataset	  (for	  prime	  ministers)	  is	  2066,	  with	  185,	  or	  just	  under	  9%	  missing	  data	  points	  for	  the	  various	  ministries.21	  	  	  Once	  the	  full	  set	  of	  national	  ministers	  and	  their	  political	  party	  affiliations	  in	  these	  13	  policy	  areas	  was	  collected	  information	  about	  their	  ideological	  position	  was	  added	  using	  the	  Chapel	  Hill	  Expert	  Surveys	  (CHES)	  for	  1999,	  2002,	  2006	  and	  2010.22	  Although	  the	  CHES	  surveys	  include	  a	  broad	  variety	  of	  measure	  of	  ideological	  position,	  comparatively	  few	  are	  available	  across	  all	  four	  surveys.	  To	  ensure	  comparability	  only	  four	  measures	  were	  used	  for	  this	  analysis.	  Two	  measures	  focused	  on	  the	  general	  ideological	  positions	  of	  the	  parties	  –	  the	  traditional	  left-­‐right	  axis	  (scored	  1-­‐10)	  and	  the	  GAL-­‐TAN	  position	  (scored	  1-­‐10).23	  In	  addition,	  two	  measures	  of	  EU	  position	  were	  used,	  one	  measuring	  relative	  support	  of	  integration	  (EU-­‐position	  scored	  1-­‐7)	  and	  EU	  saliency	  (scored	  1-­‐4).	  	  The	  goal	  of	  building	  this	  dataset	  was	  to	  gather	  information	  about	  the	  individuals	  representing	  the	  member	  states	  within	  the	  Council,	  and	  in	  particular	  to	  determine	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  there	  are	  differences	  between	  the	  various	  individuals	  representing	  the	  member	  states.	  Given	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  portfolio	  allocation	  occurs	  at	  the	  member	  state	  level	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  anticipate	  certain	  patterns	  in	  party	  identity	  and	  ministry	  assignments.	  For	  example,	  where	  a	  Green	  party	  is	  a	  member	  of	  the	  coalition	  it	  is	  generally	  given	  the	  Environment	  portfolio,	  and	  often	  the	  Agriculture	  portfolio.	  Liberal	  parties	  tend	  to	  get	  the	  Economics	  portfolio	  and	  Socialist	  and	  Social	  Democratic	  parties	  are	  often	  assigned	  to	  the	  Employment	  or	  Labor	  ministry.	  To	  determine	  if	  these	  sorts	  of	  patterns	  are	  evident	  at	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Ideally	  this	  data	  would	  be	  collected	  monthly,	  but	  that	  would	  be	  extremely	  difficult	  as	  many	  of	  the	  entries	  are	  not	  detailed	  enough.	  It	  may	  be	  possible	  in	  future	  iterations	  to	  divide	  years	  in	  two	  and	  use	  semester	  entries	  (Jan-­‐June	  and	  July-­‐December)	  for	  greater	  accuracy.	  20	  This	  strategy	  was	  followed	  even	  when	  there	  was	  a	  single	  party	  government	  to	  avoid	  any	  biases	  in	  the	  data.	  While	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  infer	  the	  partisan	  identity	  in	  a	  single	  party	  government,	  the	  fact	  that	  single	  party	  governments	  would	  have	  no	  missing	  data	  while	  coalition	  governments	  would	  randomly	  have	  missing	  data	  would	  generate	  an	  artificial	  bias	  in	  the	  data	  and	  exaggerate	  the	  impact	  of	  single	  party	  governments.	  	  21	  This	  includes	  several	  “technical”	  governments	  (coded	  as	  non-­‐partisan)	  that	  took	  office	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  Euro	  crisis.	  22	  The	  CHES	  data	  aggregates	  responses	  by	  country	  experts	  to	  a	  series	  of	  questions	  regarding	  the	  ideological	  positions	  of	  the	  political	  parties	  within	  a	  country.	  Detailed	  information	  on	  both	  the	  surveys	  and	  the	  compilation	  of	  the	  responses	  can	  be	  found	  at	  http://www.unc.edu/~hooghe/data_pp.php.	  	  23	  The	  GAL-­‐TAN	  axis	  measures	  ideological	  positional	  along	  an	  alternative	  ideological	  spectrum	  running	  from	  Green-­‐Alternative-­‐Left	  (GAL)	  to	  Traditional-­‐Authoritarian-­‐Nationalist	  (TAN).	  Although	  there	  is	  generally	  a	  high	  level	  of	  correlation	  between	  the	  left-­‐right	  and	  GAL-­‐TAN	  spectrums,	  there	  are	  some	  significant	  variations	  for	  particular	  parties	  (Green	  parties	  for	  example).	  See	  Marks	  et	  al,	  2006	  for	  additional	  details.	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Agriculture Avg. 6.03 5.29 5.74 6.04 8.29 8.03 7.36 7.52 
Comm-Tech Avg. 5.96 5.90 5.53 5.12 8.28 8.77 7.54 7.99 
Culture Avg. 5.48 5.58 5.34 5.16 8.33 8.82 7.30 7.93 
Economy Avg. 5.90 5.62 5.50 5.62 8.45 8.51 7.44 7.80 
Employment Avg. 5.47 5.37 5.22 5.51 8.29 8.31 7.42 7.68 
Environment Avg. 5.44 5.70 5.13 5.82 8.24 7.93 7.37 7.40 
For. Affairs Avg. 5.71 5.59 5.37 5.45 8.47 8.89 7.40 8.10 
Interior Avg. 5.91 5.50 5.36 5.48 8.43 8.33 7.61 7.73 
Justice Avg. 5.79 5.96 5.46 5.44 8.06 8.33 7.32 7.76 
Mari-Fish Avg. 25 5.37 *** 4.86 *** 8.58 *** 7.62 *** 
PM Avg. 5.66 5.68 5.42 5.42 8.48 8.67 7.48 8.21 
Transport Avg. 5.69 5.78 5.62 5.44 8.12 8.41 7.38 7.80 
Overall Averages 5.70 5.85 5.38 5.74 8.33 8.12 7.44 7.85 *Taxation	  and	  Customs	  not	  reported	  because	  there	  were	  too	  few	  entries	  	  Figure	  1	  presents	  the	  median	  and	  quartile	  positions	  for	  each	  ministry	  for	  all	  member	  states.	  The	  PM	  is	  highlighted	  for	  ease	  of	  comparison	  to	  the	  other	  ministries	  and	  horizontal	  markers	  for	  the	  PM	  median	  have	  been	  added.	  The	  most	  obvious	  finding	  is	  that	  in	  a	  number	  of	  policy	  areas	  the	  ideological	  positions	  of	  the	  ministers	  in	  the	  Council	  formations	  regularly	  deviate	  from	  the	  median	  position	  of	  the	  Prime	  Ministers.	  Moreover,	  these	  deviations	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  easy	  comparison	  both	  EU	  scores	  have	  been	  rescaled	  to	  range	  from	  1-­‐10	  like	  the	  left-­‐right	  and	  GAL-­‐TAN	  measures.	  25	  The	  results	  for	  this	  arena	  for	  the	  new	  member	  states	  are	  not	  included	  as	  they	  are	  driven	  overwhelmingly	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  Polish	  LPR	  in	  this	  ministry.	  Most	  new	  member	  states	  do	  not	  include	  a	  specific	  ministry	  for	  maritime	  and	  fisheries	  policy	  resulting	  in	  these	  entries	  have	  an	  undue	  weight	  on	  the	  average	  results	  of	  the	  new	  member	  states.	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not	  consistently	  to	  the	  left	  (GAL)	  or	  right	  (TAN)	  sides	  of	  the	  ideological	  spectrum.	  Rather,	  some	  policy	  arenas	  tend	  to	  have	  ministers	  who	  fall	  to	  the	  right	  of	  the	  prime	  minister	  (justice,	  interior,	  economics)	  while	  others	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  ministers	  that	  fall	  to	  the	  left	  of	  the	  prime	  minister	  (transport,	  environment,	  employment).	  Similarly,	  in	  most	  cases	  these	  same	  ministers	  are	  further	  towards	  the	  TAN	  side	  of	  the	  GAL-­‐TAN	  spectrum,	  but	  not	  always	  (see	  transport	  for	  example).	  There	  are	  also	  ministries	  that	  tend	  to	  fall	  very	  close	  to	  the	  ideological	  positions	  of	  the	  prime	  ministers	  (justice	  and	  foreign	  affairs	  in	  particular).	  	  	  Figure	  1:	  Box	  plot	  All	  Member	  States	  Left	  Right	  and	  GAL-­‐TAN	  (2000-­‐2012)	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the	  measure	  of	  overall	  EU	  position.	  Across	  all	  policy	  areas	  there	  is	  a	  very	  high	  median	  position	  on	  EU	  integration	  and	  comparatively	  few	  instances	  of	  substantial	  differentiation	  from	  the	  average	  position	  of	  the	  prime	  ministers,	  with	  again	  the	  exception	  of	  agriculture,	  environment	  and	  transport,	  which	  all	  show	  notably	  lower	  levels	  of	  EU	  support.	  There	  is	  even	  less	  variation	  for	  EU	  saliency,	  although	  the	  general	  level	  of	  EU	  saliency	  is	  low	  compared	  to	  overall	  position	  on	  the	  EU.26	  	  Figure	  2:	  Box	  plot	  New	  Data-­‐	  EU-­‐POS	  and	  EU-­‐SAL	  (rescaled	  1-­‐10)	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as	  an	  initial	  test	  of	  the	  potential	  impact	  of	  ideology	  on	  Council	  decision-­‐making	  and	  the	  EU	  policy	  process.	  Once	  we	  have	  established	  which	  configurations	  (committees)	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  deviate	  from	  the	  EU	  QMV	  outcome	  we	  can	  test	  these	  predictions	  on	  existing	  data	  regarding	  EU	  member	  state	  positions	  and	  policy	  outcomes	  from	  the	  DEU	  II	  dataset	  (below).	  	  The	  first	  step	  is	  to	  determine	  if	  the	  variations	  between	  the	  median	  ideological	  and	  EU	  positions	  of	  the	  various	  configurations	  are	  statistically	  significant.	  To	  this	  end	  a	  Kruskal-­‐Wallis	  rank	  test	  was	  run	  for	  each	  of	  the	  four	  measures	  of	  ideological/EU	  position	  (Table	  2).28	  	  The	  results	  of	  this	  test	  demonstrate	  that	  for	  all	  four	  measures	  of	  ideology	  there	  are	  statistically	  significant	  variations	  between	  the	  various	  configurations,	  most	  notably	  for	  the	  measure	  of	  support	  for	  the	  EU.	  While	  this	  is	  useful,	  it	  does	  not	  provide	  information	  on	  
which	  configurations	  deviate	  most	  from	  the	  positions	  of	  the	  prime	  ministers	  (and	  the	  likely	  official	  member	  state	  position).	  	  	  Table	  2:	  Kruskal-­‐Wallis	  Rank	  Tests	  
Variable Chi-Squared Probability DF 
Left-Right 26.849 0.0081 12 
GAL-TAN 20.141 0.0645 12 
EU-Position 35.492 0.0004 12 
EU-Saliency 25.71 0.0118 12 	  To	  gain	  greater	  insight	  into	  the	  variations	  between	  configurations	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  use	  simple	  OLS	  regressions	  using	  the	  ideology	  scores	  as	  the	  dependent	  variables	  and	  prime	  minister	  as	  the	  omitted	  category.	  These	  tests	  are	  not	  being	  used	  to	  test	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  various	  configurations	  to	  predict	  the	  ideology	  and	  EU	  position	  scores,	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  indicators	  of	  which	  configurations	  deviate	  significantly	  from	  the	  prime	  minister	  along	  the	  four	  measures	  and	  in	  which	  direction.	  For	  this	  reason	  the	  poor	  explanatory	  power/fit	  of	  the	  models	  presented	  (R-­‐squared	  and	  Adj.	  R-­‐squared	  scores)	  are	  not	  a	  concern.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  four	  analyses	  are	  presented	  in	  Table	  3.	  	   Insert	  Table	  3	  Here	  	  The	  results	  of	  the	  regressions	  underscore	  the	  variations	  across	  policy	  areas	  and	  across	  measures	  of	  ideology	  and	  EU	  position.	  Along	  the	  left-­‐right	  ideological	  spectrum	  just	  two	  configurations	  stand	  out	  as	  notably	  significant,	  employment	  and	  justice.	  On	  the	  whole	  employment	  ministers	  tend	  to	  be	  further	  to	  the	  left	  than	  their	  prime	  ministers,	  a	  finding	  that	  supports	  the	  expectation	  that	  socialist	  and	  social	  democratic	  parties	  will	  tend	  to	  hold	  this	  portfolio	  when	  included	  in	  coalition	  governments.	  In	  contrast,	  ministers	  of	  justice	  tend	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  An alternative test would be to run one-way ANOVA tests of significance. However, ANOVA  assumes 
that the underlying data is normally distributed, and thus tests the statistical difference of the means. 
Since we do not expect a normal distribution of the underlying data, the Kruskal–Wallis test, which is 
designed for non-parametric data, is a better choice. To double check, multivariate means tests were also 
conducted and these provided very similar results.  	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to	  be	  further	  to	  the	  right	  than	  prime	  ministers,	  suggesting	  that	  this	  post	  is	  often	  held	  by	  “law	  and	  order”	  oriented	  parties	  of	  the	  center-­‐right.	  The	  only	  policy	  arena	  to	  show	  significant	  deviation	  from	  prime	  ministers	  along	  the	  GAL-­‐TAN	  measure	  is	  agriculture.	  In	  this	  case	  agricultural	  ministers	  appear	  to	  be	  significantly	  further	  towards	  the	  “traditional–	  authoritarian-­‐nationalist	  side	  of	  the	  spectrum.	  	  	  The	  EU	  position	  and	  EU	  saliency	  measures	  show	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  differentiation	  between	  ministers	  and	  prime	  ministers.	  	  For	  EU	  position	  agriculture,	  communication	  and	  technology,	  employment,	  environment,	  justice	  and	  transport	  are	  all	  highly	  significant.	  Perhaps	  more	  interesting	  is	  that	  all	  of	  these	  policy	  areas	  have	  negative	  coefficients	  meaning	  that	  the	  ministers	  are	  less	  supportive	  of	  EU	  integration	  than	  the	  prime	  ministers.	  This	  pattern	  reflects	  the	  distribution	  of	  support	  for	  the	  EU	  along	  the	  left-­‐right/GAL-­‐TAN	  spectrums.	  In	  general,	  parties	  of	  the	  center	  (social-­‐democrats,	  liberals,	  Christian	  democrats)	  have	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  support	  for	  the	  EU	  than	  do	  those	  of	  either	  the	  right	  (nationalist	  parties,	  conservative	  parties)	  of	  the	  left	  (communist,	  socialist,	  green	  parties).	  Since	  most	  prime	  ministers	  in	  coalition	  governments	  are	  drawn	  from	  the	  centrist	  parties	  the	  tendency	  will	  be	  for	  their	  ministers	  (representing	  less	  moderate	  coalition	  parties	  of	  the	  right	  or	  left)	  will	  be	  less	  supportive	  of	  EU	  integration.	  	  The	  EU	  saliency	  results	  are	  largely	  similar	  to	  the	  EU	  position	  outcomes	  (although	  communication	  and	  technology	  is	  not	  significant	  while	  economy	  is)	  and	  once	  again	  the	  coefficients	  are	  all	  negative.	  This	  outcome	  is	  somewhat	  more	  surprising,	  as	  many	  of	  the	  parties	  of	  the	  left	  and	  right	  actually	  campaign	  on	  EU-­‐related	  issues,	  while	  the	  more	  main	  stream	  parties	  tend	  to	  try	  to	  avoid	  directly	  addressing	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  topic	  of	  political	  debate.	  This	  should	  suggest	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  more,	  not	  less	  salient	  for	  these	  parties.	  The	  negative	  outcomes	  reported	  in	  Table	  3	  may	  be	  a	  result	  of	  the	  underlying	  character	  of	  the	  CHES	  survey	  data	  and	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  questions	  were	  posed	  to	  experts.	  	  
Does	  Ideology	  Matter?	  	  The	  results	  found	  thus	  far	  suggest	  that	  there	  are	  statistically	  significant	  differences	  between	  ministries	  (Table	  2)	  and	  between	  some	  policy	  areas	  and	  the	  prime	  ministers	  as	  a	  group	  (Table	  3).	  Over	  all	  employment	  ministers	  fall	  to	  the	  left	  and	  justice	  ministers	  fall	  to	  the	  right	  of	  prime	  ministers,	  while	  agricultural	  ministers	  tend	  toward	  to	  be	  more	  traditional-­‐authoritarian-­‐nationalist	  than	  prime	  ministers.	  In	  addition,	  ministers	  in	  many	  policy	  areas	  tend	  to	  be	  far	  more	  euro-­‐skeptic	  than	  prime	  ministers	  (especially	  agriculture,	  employment,	  environment,	  justice	  and	  transport).	  The	  question	  is	  what	  difference	  does	  this	  make,	  if	  any,	  on	  EU	  policy	  outcomes?	  Are	  ministers	  able	  to	  use	  Council	  configurations	  as	  distributive	  committees	  to	  shift	  policy	  outcomes	  in	  their	  preferred	  direction?	  	  	  This	  is	  a	  difficult	  question	  to	  answer	  because	  there	  are	  few	  measures	  of	  official	  national	  positions	  on	  policies	  in	  the	  EU.	  Ideally	  we	  would	  have	  a	  measure	  of	  the	  preferences	  of	  all	  national	  ministers	  and	  prime	  ministers	  for	  policies	  and	  then	  be	  able	  to	  compare	  these	  positions	  to	  actual	  outcomes	  to	  determine	  which	  were	  more	  influential	  in	  determining	  the	  outcomes.	  Alas,	  this	  type	  of	  information	  is	  rarely	  available	  for	  a	  specific	  policy	  in	  a	  single	  country	  and	  certainly	  not	  for	  multiple	  policies	  across	  all	  EU	  member	  states.	  However,	  the	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Decision-­‐making	  in	  Europe	  (DEU	  II)	  dataset	  does	  provide	  a	  possible	  substitute,	  though	  not	  without	  some	  reservations.29	  	  The	  DEU	  II	  dataset	  was	  designed	  to	  evaluate	  the	  impact	  of	  decision	  rules	  on	  policy-­‐making	  in	  the	  EU.	  It	  uses	  349	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  with	  non-­‐elected	  actors	  directly	  engaged	  in	  the	  policy	  making	  process	  to	  approximate	  measures	  for	  member	  state	  and	  institution	  positions	  on	  331	  contentious	  issues	  within	  125	  legislative	  initiatives	  between	  1995	  and	  2008.	  Those	  interviewed	  included	  member-­‐state	  representatives	  (permanent	  representatives),	  EU	  level	  actors	  (various	  institutional	  secretariats)	  as	  well	  as	  some	  interest	  group	  representatives	  (Thompson	  et	  al,	  2012:	  Table	  2:	  609).	  Participants	  were	  asked	  to	  identify	  the	  policy	  positions	  of	  the	  relevant	  actors	  on	  key	  controversial	  issues	  within	  the	  broader	  policy	  initiatives.	  Individual	  actor	  positions	  were	  placed	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  0-­‐100	  (ostensibly	  from	  least	  to	  most	  pro-­‐integrationist).	  These	  scores	  were	  aggregated	  to	  produce	  individual	  scores	  for	  each	  issue	  for	  each	  member	  states,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  Commission	  (Thomson	  et	  al,	  2012).30	  	  	  The	  overlap	  between	  the	  DEU	  II	  dataset	  and	  the	  national	  minister	  dataset	  utilized	  here	  is	  somewhat	  limited.	  Only	  those	  policies	  initiated	  after	  2000	  and	  only	  those	  for	  which	  national	  ministers	  could	  be	  reliably	  and	  comprehensively	  identified	  can	  be	  included.31	  This	  reduces	  the	  overall	  DEU	  II	  dataset	  analyzed	  here	  to	  just	  100	  policy	  issues.	  Moreover,	  because	  the	  DEU	  II	  project	  specifically	  targeted	  contentious	  issues	  the	  policy	  spectrum	  is	  relatively	  limited	  and	  biased	  in	  favor	  of	  those	  policy	  areas	  where	  there	  is	  a	  large	  differentiation	  between	  ministers	  and	  prime	  ministers.	  In	  particular,	  agriculture,	  environment	  and	  transport,	  though	  the	  dataset	  also	  includes	  issues	  from	  the	  employment	  and	  external	  affairs	  Council	  configurations.	  	  In	  addition,	  while	  providing	  extremely	  useful	  information,	  the	  DEU	  II	  dataset	  does	  not	  permit	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  individual	  interview	  responses	  to	  allow	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  differences	  between	  institutional	  and	  member	  state	  representatives.32	  Such	  an	  analysis	  might	  provide	  insight	  into	  the	  political	  origin	  of	  the	  DEU	  II	  country	  position	  scores.	  More	  specifically,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  measured	  country	  scores	  represent	  an	  ‘official’	  member	  state	  position	  or	  the	  position	  of	  the	  specific	  ministry,	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  individual	  minister	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  policy	  area	  is	  not	  clear.	  As	  has	  been	  demonstrated	  above,	  there	  may	  be	  substantial	  (statistically	  significant)	  differences	  between	  these	  positions.	  Moreover,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  The	  DEU	  II	  dataset	  built	  upon	  a	  previous	  research	  project	  (DEU)	  that	  examined	  proposals	  that	  were	  introduced	  or	  pending	  between	  1999	  and	  2000	  (Thomson,	  Stokman,	  Achen	  and	  Konig	  (eds),	  2006)	  	  30	  The	  dataset	  and	  codebook	  are	  available	  at:	  http://www.robertthomson.info/research/resolving-­‐controversy-­‐in-­‐the-­‐eu.	  	  31	  Information	  for	  Justice	  Ministers	  was	  only	  recently	  added	  to	  the	  database	  used	  here	  and	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  fully	  integrated	  with	  the	  DEU	  II	  data	  set.	  This	  is	  in	  progress	  and	  will	  add	  an	  additional	  22	  issues.	  Unfortunately	  there	  is	  not	  enough	  data	  on	  national	  ministers	  to	  also	  allow	  for	  the	  inclusion	  of	  data	  for	  communication-­‐technology,	  maritime-­‐fisheries	  or	  taxation	  and	  customs	  as	  few	  countries	  consistently	  had	  national	  ministries	  with	  these	  words	  in	  their	  titles	  so	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  know	  reliably	  which	  ministers	  were	  tasked	  with	  these	  policy	  arenas,	  32	  In	  addition,	  there	  were	  only	  nine	  members	  of	  the	  Council	  secretariat	  interviewed	  in	  total	  (both	  the	  original	  DEU	  and	  the	  DEU	  II	  data	  collection	  waves)	  as	  compared	  to	  236	  permanent	  representatives	  of	  the	  member	  states	  (Thomson	  et	  al,	  2012:	  609)	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to	  fully	  understand	  the	  impact	  of	  these	  differences	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  understand	  which	  actors	  are	  driving	  the	  country	  position	  assigned	  in	  the	  DEU	  II	  study	  to	  be	  able	  to	  use	  this	  data	  to	  evaluate	  the	  relative	  impact	  of	  the	  various	  actors	  on	  the	  final	  policy	  outcomes.	  	  	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  try	  to	  intuit	  the	  origin	  of	  these	  scores	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  information	  available	  about	  the	  ideological	  identity	  and	  EU	  position	  of	  the	  ministers	  and	  prime	  ministers	  of	  the	  member	  states.	  Though	  far	  from	  ideal	  this	  approach	  does	  provide	  some	  information	  regarding	  the	  correlation	  between	  actor	  ideology/EU	  position	  and	  the	  DEU	  II	  country	  position	  scores.	  To	  facilitate	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  DEU	  II	  country	  scores	  the	  original	  scale	  of	  0-­‐100	  was	  reduced	  to	  a	  scale	  ranging	  from	  0-­‐10.	  The	  original	  data	  clusters	  around	  several	  key	  points	  (0,	  20,	  40,	  50,	  50	  and	  100)	  and	  does	  not	  permit	  the	  use	  of	  an	  OLS	  regression	  analysis	  (Annex	  1a).	  The	  creation	  of	  a	  scale	  from	  1-­‐10	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  evaluate	  the	  data	  using	  ordered	  regression	  analysis	  (Freese	  and	  Long,	  1997)	  The	  results	  are	  presented	  in	  Table	  4.33	  	  Table	  4:	  Ordered	  Logit	  analysis	  of	  DEU	  II	  Country	  Position	  Scores	  (0-­‐10	  scale)34	  
 
Left-Right GAL-TAN EU-POS 
 
Coef. t(P>|t|) Coef. t(P>|t|) Coef. t(P>|t|) 
PM 0.035205 0.92 (0.358) -0.060242 -1.54 (0.122) 0.1443695 1.89 (0.058) 
Minister -0.0741224 -1.93 (0.053) 0.0048733 0.14 (0.886) -0.0918256 -1.42 (0.154) 
# of obs. 1650 1650 1650 
LR chi2(2) 3.95 4.63 3.64 
Prob > chi2 0.1391 0.0989 0.1619 
Pseudo R2 0.0007 0.0008 0.0006 	  While	  the	  relative	  GAL-­‐TAN	  scores	  for	  ministers	  and	  prime	  ministers	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  a	  significant	  correlation	  with	  the	  DEU	  II	  country	  scores	  both	  left-­‐right	  scores	  and	  EU	  positions	  do.35	  As	  should	  be	  expected	  given	  the	  initial	  analysis	  of	  minister	  and	  prime	  minister	  scores	  on	  these	  two	  measures	  of	  ideology	  the	  signs	  of	  the	  coefficients	  are	  opposite	  in	  all	  cases.	  Thus,	  ministers	  are	  negatively	  associated	  with	  DEU	  II	  country	  scores	  on	  the	  left-­‐right	  and	  EU	  position	  axes	  and	  positively	  along	  the	  GAL-­‐TAN	  axis,	  while	  prime	  minsters	  are	  the	  opposite.	  Only	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  left-­‐right	  axis	  is	  the	  result	  statistically	  significant	  for	  ministers,	  while	  the	  EU	  position	  is	  the	  only	  significant	  measure	  for	  prime	  ministers.	  	  	  Substantively	  these	  results	  can	  be	  interpreted	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  percentage	  changes	  in	  the	  odds	  of	  the	  predicted	  outcomes.	  Using	  this	  measure,	  a	  one-­‐unit	  increase	  in	  the	  left-­‐right	  ideology	  score	  for	  ministers	  decreases	  the	  odds	  of	  a	  country	  having	  the	  highest	  DEU	  II	  (scaled)	  country	  score	  by	  7.1%.	  In	  other	  words,	  as	  ministers	  move	  towards	  the	  right	  on	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Ordered	  logit	  regressions	  employ	  a	  maximum	  likelihood	  model	  and	  treat	  the	  dependent	  variable	  as	  an	  ordinal	  variable	  rather	  than	  a	  continuous	  variable	  as	  assumed	  in	  OLS	  analysis.	  34	  The	  analysis	  for	  EU	  saliency	  is	  not	  reported	  here	  as	  saliency	  is	  not	  in	  o=and	  of	  itself	  a	  measure	  of	  ideological	  position.	  It	  is	  not	  significant	  for	  either	  ministers	  or	  prime	  ministers	  however.	  35	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  again	  that	  this	  analysis	  is	  not	  attempting	  to	  build	  a	  comprehensive	  model	  to	  explain	  the	  DEU	  II	  country	  scores	  and	  thus	  the	  relatively	  weak	  goodness	  of	  fit	  for	  the	  model	  as	  a	  whole	  is	  not	  troublesome.	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left-­‐right	  spectrum	  the	  DEU	  II	  country	  score	  will	  be	  lower,	  or	  less	  integrationist.	  In	  contrast,	  a	  one-­‐unit	  increase	  in	  the	  EU	  position	  score	  of	  the	  prime	  minister	  increases	  the	  odds	  of	  the	  highest	  DEU	  II	  country	  score	  by	  15.5%	  (see	  Annex	  II	  A	  and	  B	  for	  odds	  ratios).	  	  What	  these	  results	  suggest	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  easy	  answer	  regarding	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  DEU	  II	  country	  scores.	  The	  ideological	  and	  EU	  positions	  of	  both	  ministers	  and	  prime	  ministers	  appear	  to	  have	  an	  impact.	  The	  difference	  in	  that	  while	  the	  EU	  positions	  of	  prime	  ministers	  are	  positively	  correlated	  with	  high	  DEU	  II	  country	  scores;	  the	  left-­‐right	  ideological	  positions	  of	  the	  ministers	  are	  negatively	  correlated	  with	  them.	  This	  is	  not	  surprising	  given	  that	  the	  DEU	  II	  dataset	  is	  skewed	  towards	  those	  policy	  arenas	  in	  which	  the	  ministers	  tend	  towards	  the	  extremes	  on	  the	  left-­‐right	  spectrum	  and	  are	  thus	  notably	  less	  supportive	  of	  the	  EU.36	  Given	  that	  the	  DEU	  II	  country	  scores	  are	  loosely	  measuring	  the	  relative	  support	  for	  increased	  integration	  of	  the	  member	  states	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  it	  is	  the	  measure	  of	  EU	  position	  is	  most	  informative,	  but	  by	  no	  means	  determinative	  of	  reported	  DEU	  II	  country	  position.	  It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen,	  however,	  to	  what	  extent	  either	  influences	  final	  EU	  policy	  outcomes,	  particularly	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  bicameral	  system.	  	  	  
The	  Origins	  of	  Legislative	  Outcomes	  	  	  Thus	  far	  this	  research	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  there	  are	  statistically	  significant	  variations	  between	  national	  ministers	  and	  prime	  ministers,	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  ideological	  positions	  and	  especially	  their	  support	  for	  EU	  integration;	  and	  that	  these	  conform	  to	  expectations	  based	  on	  specific	  policy	  issues.	  On	  the	  whole	  ministers	  tend	  to	  be	  further	  to	  the	  extremes	  of	  the	  left-­‐right	  and	  GAL-­‐TAN	  ideological	  spectrums	  and	  less	  supportive	  of	  EU	  integration	  than	  their	  prime	  ministers.	  This	  is	  reflected	  both	  in	  figures	  1	  and	  2	  and	  in	  the	  ordered	  logit	  regressions	  presented	  in	  Table	  4,	  which	  finds	  a	  positive	  correlation	  between	  the	  EU	  position	  of	  the	  prime	  minister	  and	  the	  DEU	  II	  Country	  position	  and	  a	  negative	  correlation	  between	  the	  left-­‐right	  ideological	  score	  of	  ministers	  and	  the	  DEU	  II	  country	  positions.	  	  These	  findings	  suggest	  that	  if	  there	  is	  conflict	  between	  prime	  ministers	  and	  their	  ministers	  over	  policy	  at	  the	  EU	  level	  prime	  ministers	  will	  tend	  to	  support	  increased	  integration,	  while	  ministers	  will	  support	  lower	  levels	  of	  integration	  or	  no	  change.	  	  These	  differences	  should	  be	  particularly	  evident	  in	  agricultural,	  communications-­‐technology,	  employment,	  environmental,	  justice	  and	  transport	  policy	  (Table	  3).	  	  	  	  Though	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  determine	  with	  certainty	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  DEU	  II	  country	  position	  scores	  (and	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  their	  origins	  vary	  between	  member	  states),	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  investigate	  the	  relative	  impact	  of	  minister	  and	  prime	  minister	  ideological	  and	  EU	  positions,	  as	  well	  as	  policy	  area	  on	  policy	  outcomes.	  The	  goal	  is	  to	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  eventual	  policy	  outcomes	  are	  influenced	  by	  the	  differences	  between	  prime	  ministers	  and	  ministers	  in	  EU	  support	  and	  ideological	  position	  as	  measured	  by	  the	  CHES	  surveys.	  To	  this	  end	  a	  new	  variable	  was	  created	  measuring	  the	  distance	  between	  these	  two	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  It	  is	  worth	  recalling	  that	  both	  the	  far	  left	  (GAL)	  and	  right	  (TAN)	  are	  associated	  with	  lower	  levels	  of	  support	  for	  EU	  integration	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scores	  for	  all	  three	  measure	  of	  ideological	  position.37	  	  The	  impact	  of	  this	  new	  variable	  is	  then	  tested	  on	  its	  own	  and	  including	  dummy	  variables	  for	  the	  various	  policy	  areas.	  As	  with	  the	  DEU	  II	  Country	  positions	  there	  is	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  clustering	  of	  the	  policy	  outcomes	  making	  it	  necessary	  to	  once	  again	  convert	  to	  a	  1-­‐10	  scale	  and	  use	  ordered	  logit	  analysis	  (Annex	  1b).38	  This	  approach	  also	  facilitates	  comparisons	  with	  the	  earlier	  analysis	  of	  country	  positions.	  The	  results	  are	  presented	  in	  Table	  5.	  	  	  Table	  5:	  Ordered	  Logit	  Analysis	  Ministers	  Vs.	  PM	  for	  DEU	  II	  Policy	  Outcomes	  (0-­‐10	  scale)	  
  Left-Right GAL-TAN EU-Position 
  Coef. t(P>|t|) Coef. t(P>|t|) Coef. t(P>|t|) 
Diff. M-PM 0.0178503 0.57 (0.571) 0.0233093 0.76 (0.685) -.0984253 -1.88 (0.060) 
Agriculture -0.5938907 -3.74 (0.000) -0.6050906 -3.81 (0.000) -0.6121259 -3.86 (0.000) 
Employment 0.1837488 0.79 (0.427) 0.1831655 0.79 (0.428) 0.170996 0.74 (0.460) 
Environment 0.2706941 1,71 (0.087) 0.2631658 1.68 (0.094) 0.2412137 1.53 (0.126) 
Transport 0.3814387 2.26 (0.024) 0.3710585 2.21 (0.027) 0.3499232 2.08 (0.038) 
Number of 
obs. 1880 1880 1880 
LR chi2(5) 99.47 99.73 101.44 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.0118 0.0118 0.012 	  The	  most	  important	  result	  from	  this	  analysis	  is	  the	  significant	  role	  that	  the	  relative	  support	  for	  EU	  integration	  has	  on	  policy	  outcomes.	  For	  each	  unit	  increase	  in	  the	  difference	  between	  a	  prime	  minister	  and	  a	  minister	  in	  level	  of	  support	  for	  EU	  integration	  the	  likelihood	  of	  the	  highest	  policy	  outcome	  score	  decreases	  by	  9.5%	  (Annex	  II	  C,	  D	  and	  E).	  However,	  neither	  differences	  in	  the	  left-­‐right	  or	  GAL-­‐TAN	  positions	  were	  statistically	  significant.	  This	  is	  like	  a	  result	  of	  the	  character	  of	  the	  DEU	  II	  dataset	  as	  the	  policy	  positions	  and	  outcomes	  are	  measured	  in	  terms	  of	  level	  of	  EU	  integration	  (more	  or	  less	  change)	  rather	  than	  left-­‐right	  or	  ideological	  positions.	  This	  creates	  a	  poor	  fit	  with	  left-­‐right	  and	  GAL-­‐TAN	  measures	  as	  these	  are	  not	  linearly	  related	  to	  levels	  of	  EU	  support,	  instead	  both	  high	  and	  low	  values	  of	  these	  scales	  tend	  to	  have	  low	  values	  of	  EU	  support,	  while	  those	  in	  the	  center	  of	  the	  spectrum	  tend	  to	  be	  most	  supportive	  of	  EU	  integration.39	  	  	  The	  impact	  of	  policy	  arena	  is	  also	  quite	  clear.	  In	  particular,	  the	  heavily	  negative	  correlation	  between	  agricultural	  policies	  and	  the	  level	  of	  integration	  achieved	  in	  the	  final	  outcome	  is	  evident.	  In	  all	  three	  models	  agriculture	  is	  strongly	  significant,	  with	  agricultural	  policies	  approximately	  45%	  less	  likely	  to	  achieve	  policy	  outcomes	  that	  reflect	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  EU	  integration	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  reserve	  policy	  area	  -­‐	  external	  affairs	  (Annex	  II	  C,	  D,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  The	  measure	  for	  EU	  saliency	  is	  not	  used	  both	  because	  this	  is	  not	  a	  measure	  of	  ideological	  position	  per	  se,	  but	  also	  because	  the	  original	  1-­‐4	  scale	  significantly	  constrains	  the	  level	  of	  possible	  differentiation.	  38	  Although	  clustered,	  it	  is	  worth	  pointing	  out	  that	  the	  outcomes	  are	  much	  more	  normally	  distributed	  aside	  form	  a	  large	  concentration	  at	  the	  “0”	  end	  of	  the	  scale	  (i.e.	  no	  change	  or	  least	  possible	  level	  of	  integration).	  This	  will	  be	  discussed	  further	  below.	  39	  As	  a	  result	  high	  and	  low	  values	  are	  essentially	  cancelling	  each	  other	  out	  for	  these	  two	  measures.	  Future	  analyses	  will	  investigate	  the	  utility	  of	  utilizing	  an	  appropriate	  transformation	  of	  these	  measures.	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E).40	  In	  contrast,	  both	  environmental	  and	  transport	  policies	  are	  positively	  correlated	  with	  more	  integrationist	  outcomes.	  Indeed,	  transport	  and	  environmental	  policies	  are	  42%	  and	  27%	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  the	  highest	  outcome	  score	  than	  policies	  in	  the	  reserve	  category	  respectively	  (Annex	  II	  C,	  D	  and	  E).	  	  The	  very	  different	  result	  for	  agricultural	  versus	  environmental	  and	  transport	  policies	  is	  initially	  puzzling	  given	  that	  in	  all	  three	  of	  these	  policy	  areas	  ministers	  were	  notably	  less	  supportive	  of	  integration	  than	  prime	  ministers	  (Figure	  2).	  This	  raises	  the	  question	  –	  why	  were	  agricultural	  ministers	  better	  able	  to	  defend	  their	  positions	  (achieve	  less	  integrationist	  policy	  outcomes)	  than	  environmental	  and	  transport	  ministers?	  The	  answer	  may	  lie	  not	  within	  the	  Council	  itself,	  but	  rather	  in	  the	  character	  of	  the	  EU	  legislative	  branch.	  In	  other	  words,	  because	  policy	  outcomes	  are	  not	  determined	  solely	  by	  the	  member	  states	  via	  their	  ministers	  in	  the	  Council	  it	  is	  important	  to	  also	  include	  the	  other	  legislative	  player	  in	  the	  analysis.	  Especially	  once	  we	  consider	  that	  during	  the	  time	  period	  covered	  by	  the	  DEU	  II	  dataset	  there	  was	  a	  fundamental	  difference	  between	  agricultural	  policies	  on	  the	  one	  side	  and	  environmental	  and	  transport	  policies	  on	  the	  other.	  While	  all	  of	  the	  decisions	  regarding	  environmental	  and	  transport	  issues	  in	  the	  DEU	  II	  dataset	  were	  dealt	  with	  under	  the	  codecision	  procedure	  during	  this	  period,	  agricultural	  policies	  fell	  almost	  exclusively	  under	  the	  consultation	  procedure.41	  This	  difference	  fundamentally	  changes	  the	  role	  of	  the	  EP	  in	  the	  decision	  making	  process	  –	  shifting	  the	  character	  of	  EU	  bicameralism	  from	  largely	  symmetrical	  to	  asymmetrical	  (Lijphart,	  1999;	  Heller	  and	  Branduse,	  2014).	  The	  significance	  of	  this	  shift	  depends	  in	  large	  part	  on	  the	  effective	  role	  of	  the	  EP	  in	  shaping	  legislative	  outcomes	  when	  empowered	  to	  do	  so.	  	  Whenever	  there	  is	  a	  bicameral	  system	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  consider	  two	  characteristics	  of	  the	  legislative	  branch:	  the	  relative	  powers	  of	  the	  two	  chambers	  (their	  symmetry)	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  have	  similar	  partisan	  identities	  (their	  congruence).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  EU	  these	  two	  characteristics	  have	  varied	  substantially	  across	  time.	  For	  most	  of	  the	  EU’s	  history	  the	  legislative	  branch	  was	  starkly	  asymmetrical	  with	  the	  EP	  having	  substantially	  less	  policy	  influence	  than	  the	  Council.	  This	  began	  to	  change	  as	  early	  as	  the	  1970s	  when	  the	  EP	  gained	  some	  powers	  over	  the	  budget,	  but	  did	  not	  fundamentally	  shift	  until	  the	  cooperation	  and	  codecision	  procedures	  were	  introduced	  in	  the	  Single	  European	  Act	  and	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  respectively.	  Even	  after	  these	  procedures	  were	  introduced,	  however,	  there	  was	  substantial	  fluctuation	  in	  the	  role	  of	  the	  EP	  as	  it	  codecision	  powers	  were	  initially	  quite	  narrowly	  defined.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  only	  after	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  that	  the	  EU	  fully	  adopted	  a	  primarily	  symmetrical	  bicameral	  structure	  through	  the	  broad	  use	  of	  the	  ordinary	  legislative	  procedure.42	  	  	  In	  terms	  of	  congruence,	  the	  EP	  and	  Council	  have	  also	  varied	  substantially	  as	  the	  electoral	  mechanisms	  of	  the	  two	  chambers	  are	  not	  directly	  linked.	  Moreover,	  while	  the	  partisan	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  External	  affairs	  is	  used	  as	  the	  reserve	  category	  because	  it	  is	  the	  policy	  area	  with	  the	  least	  difference	  between	  ministers	  and	  prime	  ministers	  and	  is	  thus	  the	  most	  ‘neutral’	  of	  those	  included	  in	  the	  DEU	  II	  dataset.	  41	  The	  same	  is	  true	  for	  the	  policies	  within	  the	  area	  of	  external	  affairs.	  42	  Though	  there	  are	  still	  some	  policy	  arenas	  in	  which	  the	  EP	  lacks	  codecision	  powers,	  including	  most	  aspects	  of	  external	  affairs.	  
DRAFT	  –	  Please	  do	  not	  cite	  without	  permission	  from	  author	   Ver.	  2.1	  
	   21	  
character	  of	  the	  EP	  is	  essentially	  fixed	  for	  five	  years	  following	  an	  election,	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Council	  may	  change	  substantially	  at	  any	  time	  as	  a	  result	  of	  national	  elections	  and	  government	  changes.	  Nonetheless,	  more	  often	  that	  not	  the	  EP	  and	  the	  Council	  have	  had	  comparatively	  low	  levels	  of	  ideological	  congruence	  with	  one	  tending	  toward	  the	  center	  left	  while	  the	  other	  tended	  toward	  the	  center	  right	  in	  terms	  of	  overall	  composition	  (though	  not	  always	  largest	  party).43	  Where	  the	  issue	  of	  congruence	  is	  most	  dramatic,	  however	  is	  on	  the	  question	  of	  support	  for	  EU	  integration.	  The	  EU	  has	  consistently	  been	  understood	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  actors	  most	  supportive	  of	  increased	  integration,	  while	  the	  Council	  is	  generally	  modeled	  as	  the	  least	  supportive	  (Tsebelis,	  2013;	  Tsebelis	  et	  al,	  2001;	  Kreppel,	  2001).	  	  	  Table	  6:	  Impact	  of	  Council	  and	  EP	  on	  Policy	  Outcomes	  
	  	                 Outcomes by Issue  
	  	   Coef. t(P>|t|) 
Country Average  0.5064009 4.21 (0.00)  
EP Position 0.1596303 1.92 (0.059) 
Agriculture -21.03421 -2.01 (.048) 
Employment 4.048743 0.22 (.829) 
Environment -4.19746 -0.40 (69.9) 
Transport 3.082448 0.28 (0.781) 
Constant 22.21826 2.15 (0.034) 
Number of obs. 88 
F (6, 81) 5.35 
R-squared 0.2836 
Adj. R-squared 0.2306 	  This	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  differences	  witnessed	  between	  agricultural	  policy	  outcomes	  and	  those	  in	  other	  policy	  areas	  might	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  EP	  to	  influence	  policy	  outcomes.	  One	  way	  to	  evaluate	  the	  relative	  impact	  of	  the	  two	  legislative	  chambers	  (as	  opposed	  to	  the	  individual	  representatives	  within	  them)	  is	  to	  examine	  their	  impact	  on	  the	  DEU	  II	  outcomes.	  This	  can	  be	  accomplished	  by	  using	  the	  average	  country	  position	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  the	  Council	  position	  and	  the	  DEU	  II	  European	  Parliament	  position	  data	  for	  the	  EP.44	  The	  results	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  EP	  is	  indeed	  both	  positive	  and	  statistically	  significant.	  In	  fact	  once	  it	  is	  included	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  individual	  policy	  areas	  almost	  disappears	  for	  environment	  and	  transport	  	  -­‐	  the	  two	  policy	  arenas	  in	  which	  the	  EP	  is	  able	  to	  have	  a	  direct	  impact	  on	  policy	  outcomes.	  In	  contrast,	  even	  after	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  EP	  in	  the	  model,	  agricultural	  policy	  remains	  both	  negative	  and	  significant	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  extent	  of	  EU	  integration	  achieved	  (Table	  6).	  These	  results	  highlight	  the	  importance	  of	  including	  the	  influence	  and	  preferences	  of	  the	  EP	  –	  as	  these	  effectively	  constrain	  the	  ability	  of	  members	  of	  the	  Council	  to	  achieve	  their	  preferred	  policy	  outcomes.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  this	  was	  not	  the	  case	  for	  much	  of	  the	  period	  covered	  here	  in	  which	  both	  chambers	  had	  a	  clear	  center-­‐right	  majority.	  44	  Using	  the	  average	  country	  position	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  the	  Council	  ignores	  the	  reality	  of	  weighted	  voting	  on	  the	  Council.	  It	  is	  also	  possible	  to	  use	  a	  weighted	  country	  position	  average	  to	  reflect	  this	  but	  the	  results	  are	  not	  substantially	  different	  and	  many	  recent	  analyses	  suggest	  that	  institutional	  norm	  of	  consensual	  decision	  making	  within	  the	  Council	  makes	  the	  average	  an	  appropriate	  proxy	  (Kreppel	  and	  Oztas,	  2014)	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Conclusions	  	  The	  results	  of	  this	  analysis	  are	  mixed.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  there	  are	  statistically	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	  ideological	  make	  up	  of	  the	  different	  Council	  configurations.	  Moreover,	  these	  follow	  the	  patterns	  anticipated	  with	  ministers	  on	  the	  whole	  falling	  to	  the	  left	  and	  right	  of	  prime	  ministers	  in	  predictable	  patterns.	  The	  more	  extreme	  ideological	  positions	  of	  ministers	  relative	  to	  prime	  ministers	  are	  also	  reflected	  in	  their	  substantially	  lower	  levels	  of	  support	  for	  EU	  integration.	  Again,	  these	  findings	  should	  not	  be	  surprising	  as	  it	  is	  well	  known	  that	  parties	  of	  the	  center	  tend	  to	  have	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  support	  for	  EU	  integration	  and	  support	  declines	  as	  ideologies	  move	  to	  the	  left	  and	  right.	  Moreover,	  as	  occurs	  in	  most	  legislatures	  only	  some	  committees	  (configurations)	  present	  substantial	  deviations	  from	  the	  mean.	  These	  tend	  to	  be	  those	  committees	  tasked	  with	  policies	  that	  have	  a	  direct	  distributional	  character	  (agriculture,	  industry,	  infrastructure)	  –	  thus,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  to	  find	  that	  it	  is	  the	  agriculture,	  environment	  and	  transport	  configurations	  that	  deviate	  most	  strongly	  and	  consistently	  throughout	  this	  analysis.	  In	  contrast,	  interior,	  justice	  and	  external	  affairs	  ministers	  mirror	  the	  ideological	  and	  EU	  positions	  of	  the	  prime	  minister	  to	  a	  much	  greater	  extent.	  	  	  These	  results	  support	  the	  call	  for	  disaggregated	  analyses	  of	  coalition	  formation	  and	  decision-­‐making	  in	  the	  Council	  that	  move	  away	  from	  treating	  member	  state	  representation	  in	  the	  Council	  as	  unitary.	  They	  also	  support	  the	  use	  of	  a	  committee-­‐based	  model	  for	  understanding	  the	  Council	  as	  a	  legislature.	  However,	  they	  do	  not	  provide	  any	  information	  as	  to	  the	  actual	  impact	  of	  these	  ideological	  differences	  on	  policy	  outcomes.	  Unfortunately	  this	  is	  a	  much	  more	  difficult	  phenomenon	  to	  assess	  directly	  because	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  consistent	  relevant	  data	  on	  prime	  minister	  and	  minister	  policy	  positions	  across	  member	  states	  and	  policy	  areas.	  	  Attempts	  to	  utilize	  the	  existing	  data	  within	  the	  DEU	  II	  data	  set	  to	  answer	  this	  question	  is	  somewhat	  mixed	  –	  in	  large	  part	  because	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  know	  with	  any	  certainty	  whether	  the	  DEU	  II	  country	  position	  scores	  reflect	  the	  position	  of	  the	  national	  prime	  minster	  or	  the	  relevant	  policy	  minister,	  and	  thus	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  use	  these	  to	  try	  to	  measure	  policy	  drift	  directly.	  The	  analysis	  conducted	  here	  suggests	  that	  both	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  country	  position,	  though	  they	  run	  in	  opposite	  directions	  with	  ministers	  associated	  with	  lower	  levels	  of	  EU	  integration	  and	  prime	  ministers	  positively	  correlated	  with	  higher	  levels	  of	  EU	  integration	  (which	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  characteristics	  discovered	  in	  the	  first	  section).	  The	  alternative	  strategy	  of	  examining	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  prime	  minister	  and	  ministers	  ideological	  positions	  suggested	  that	  the	  lower	  levels	  of	  support	  for	  EU	  integration	  of	  ministers	  is	  able	  to	  slow	  integration	  to	  a	  certain	  degree,	  but	  also	  that	  the	  policy	  area	  itself	  is	  also	  significant.	  	  	  In	  this	  case,	  however	  the	  results	  were	  mixed	  with	  policies	  in	  the	  agricultural	  arena	  generally	  achieving	  less	  integrationist	  outcomes	  compared	  to	  the	  base	  category	  (external	  affairs),	  while	  environmental	  and	  transport	  polices	  were	  more	  integrationist.	  This	  presented	  a	  puzzle	  initially	  as	  national	  ministers	  in	  all	  three	  policy-­‐arenas	  were	  significantly	  less	  supportive	  of	  EU	  integration.	  However,	  this	  puzzle	  was	  solved	  once	  the	  role	  of	  the	  EP	  and	  its	  differentiated	  potential	  to	  impact	  policy	  in	  these	  areas	  was	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incorporated	  into	  the	  analysis.	  Indeed,	  inclusion	  of	  the	  EP	  into	  the	  model	  negated	  the	  positive	  effects	  of	  environment	  and	  transport	  (where	  the	  EP	  had	  substantial	  influence)	  while	  agricultural	  policies	  (where	  the	  EP	  was	  relegated	  to	  consultative	  powers	  only)	  remained	  significant	  and	  negatively	  correlated	  with	  the	  level	  of	  EU	  integration	  achieved.	  This	  result	  in	  particular	  is	  important	  for	  understanding	  the	  original	  question	  posed	  by	  this	  research:	  does	  differentiated	  ideology	  within	  the	  Council	  impact	  EU	  Policy	  outcomes?	  The	  answer	  it	  appears	  it	  that	  it	  can,	  but	  only	  when	  the	  Council	  is	  able	  to	  act	  largely	  independently	  of	  the	  EP.	  Particularly	  as	  the	  EP	  acts	  as	  a	  critical	  balance	  to	  the	  Council	  in	  terms	  of	  support	  for	  EU	  integration	  –	  While	  the	  Council	  (regardless	  of	  a	  left	  or	  right	  ideological	  tendencies)	  is	  less	  supportive	  than	  the	  member	  state	  prime	  ministers	  of	  increased	  EU	  integration,	  the	  general	  consensus	  is	  that	  the	  EP	  is	  more	  support	  of	  increased	  EU	  integration	  than	  either.	  	  Thus,	  when	  the	  EP	  is	  able	  to	  effectively	  participate	  in	  legislative	  decision	  making	  it	  is	  able	  to	  pull	  the	  policy	  outcomes	  toward	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  EU	  integration,	  in	  a	  sense	  negating	  the	  opportunity	  presented	  by	  the	  character	  of	  the	  Council	  as	  an	  institution	  for	  policy	  drift	  and	  reducing	  the	  potential	  impact	  of	  ideology	  within	  the	  Council	  on	  EU	  Policy	  outcomes.	  Given	  the	  changes	  wrought	  by	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Ordinary	  Legislative	  Procedure	  in	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty,	  these	  results	  suggest	  that	  the	  Council	  will	  be	  more	  constrained	  by	  a	  powerful	  EP	  in	  the	  future	  than	  it	  was	  by	  distant	  prime	  ministers	  in	  the	  past.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
